When politicians mark their own exam papers and control entry standards into the Bar. Why the LPQB amendments should terrify ordinary Malaysians. And why you should say “No!” to this amendment.
The Anwar government is changing who controls the gate into the legal profession. A Minister will choose – and can remove – most of the people who decide who becomes a lawyer. When politicians control that gate, future lawyers may think twice before taking cases against the government. And when that happens, ordinary Malaysians may struggle to find truly independent help in court.
I. A Simple Question: Who Chooses the Referee?
[1]. Imagine a football final where one team not only picks the referee, but can also sack the referee halfway through the match — without giving any reason. Would you still trust the result?
[2]. That, in essence, is what the government has done with the Legal Profession Qualifying Board (‘LPQB’) through recent amendments to the Legal Profession Act 1976 (‘LPA’). Bill No. 2 of 2025 gives the Minister the power to appoint and remove the majority of those who control who can become a lawyer in Malaysia.1 Malaysian Bar, ‘The Legal Profession Qualifying Board: Executive Encroachment and Other Non Sequiturs’, Circular No 002/2026, explaining that the Minister appoints 8 of 13 LPQB members and may remove 7 without reasons.
[3]. If you think this sounds like politicians marking their own exam papers, you are not wrong.
II. What is the LPQB—and why does it matter?
[4]. The LPQB is the gatekeeper to the legal profession in Peninsular Malaysia. It decides who is qualified, what exams must be passed, and what standards law schools and law graduates must meet before anyone can call themselves an advocate and solicitor.2 Legal Profession Act 1976, ss 4–5, and Malaysian Bar, Circular No 002/2026, section on LPQB functions
[5]. Since 1976, the Board has been small and mixed: chaired by the Attorney General, with two judges nominated by the Chief Justice, the President of the Malaysian Bar, and one academic nominated by the Minister of Higher Education – five people in total.3 Letter from the President of the Malaysian Bar to the Prime Minister dated 1 Dec 2025, reproduced in Malaysian Bar Circular No 002/2026, paras 2–3. The idea was simple: those who actually work in and with the courts should set the standards for those who want to join the profession, with limited political involvement at the edges, not at the centre.4 Ibid, paras 2–3, emphasising the LPQB’s mandate over standards and legal education.
[6]. For ordinary Malaysians, this matters because when you are cheated by a company, abused by an employer, or mistreated by a government agency, you need a lawyer who is not scared of politicians and who has been admitted on merit, not on political favour.5 Malaysian Bar, Circular No 002/2026, sections ‘Principles’ and ‘Next Steps’, stressing the link between independent legal education and rule of law.
III. What has the government changed?
[7]. The Legal Profession (Amendment) Bill (No. 2) 2025, now passed by both the Dewan Rakyat and Dewan Negara, makes three big moves in relation to the LPQB.6Malaysian Bar, Circular No 002/2026, ‘The Legal Profession Qualifying Board: Executive Encroachment and Other Non Sequiturs’, introductory paragraphs and note that Bill No. 2 passed the Dewan Rakyat on 1 Dec 2025 and the Dewan Negara on 17 Dec 2025.
(a). The Board is enlarged – but the government dominates it: The LPQB is expanded from five members to thirteen, but eight of those thirteen are now appointed by the Minister.7 Malaysian Bar Circular No 002/2026, ‘Serious Concerns over Bill No. 2 – Ministerial Appointment of a Majority of LPQB Members’. The Bar and the Judiciary, who previously held three out of five seats (a clear relative majority), are now reduced to a small minority of four out of thirteen.8 Ibid, ‘Serious Concerns over Bill No. 2 – Dilution of Representation from the Judiciary and the Malaysian Bar’.
(b). The Minister can remove most of the Board without reasons: The amendments give the Minister power to remove seven out of thirteen members of the LPQB without needing to provide any reasons.9 Ibid, ‘Power to Remove Members without Assigning Reasons’. In other words, if a Board member becomes too independent or inconvenient, the Minister can simply show them the door.
(c). The Minister controls allowances and can create new committees: The Minister will now control the pay and perks of Board members and may create new committees whose finances are likewise effectively under ministerial control.10 Ibid, ‘Ministerial Control over Pay and Perks of Board Members’. This is a neat way to ensure that those who depend on LPQB allowances know exactly whose hand is on the tap.
[8]. There are also changes to representation, including the addition of seats linked to Sabah and Sarawak, even though the LPA does not itself apply in Sabah and Sarawak— without a specific order by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong.11 Ibid, ‘Inclusion of Sabah and Sarawak in the LPQB’ and discussion of s 2 LPA and the absence of an order applying the Act to Sabah and Sarawak. That may sound ‘inclusive’, but it is a red herring. The way it is structured ends up diluting the voice of the Peninsular Bar that is actually bound by the LPQB’s decisions.
IV. The government’s justifications – and the missing pieces
[9]. On paper and in speeches, the government dresses up these amendments up in familiar, comforting words: ‘reform’, ‘modernisation’, ‘better governance’, and concerns over the LPQB’s ‘finances’ and ‘lack of audits’.12 Malaysian Bar Circular No 002/2026, sections ‘Misinformation and Disinformation’ and ‘Actions Undertaken by the Bar Council’, noting reliance on audit and governance concerns; see also Letter to the Prime Minister, para 3.
[10]. We are told that:
(a). The Board needs to be ‘more representative’ and ‘efficient’.
(b). Financial governance must be ‘tightened’, especially given the LPQB’s ‘sizeable funds’
(c). Political party figures ‘should not’ sit on the Board.
[11]. On the face of it, these sound like sensible aims—in the abstract. The Bar itself has supported a more representative and effective Board, including adding a full-time academic from a private university, requiring at least six meetings a year, and allowing meetings without the Attorney General present.13 Letter from the President of the Malaysian Bar to the Prime Minister, paras 3 and 3(I)–(III), welcoming specific reforms The Bar also supported the introduction of section 9A LPA in May 2025, which now mandates annual audits of the LPQB by the Auditor‑General.14 Malaysian Bar Circular No 002/2026, ‘Misinformation and Disinformation’, explaining the introduction of s 9A LPA and annual audit requirements.
[12]. So the question is not whether improvement is needed, but whether these particular amendments are a genuine reform – or a ‘power grab’ in the disguise of reform.
V. Why these amendments are dangerous
A. Government control over the Gatekeepers
[13]. When the Minister appoints eight out of thirteen members, controls their allowances, and can sack most of them without reasons, the LPQB stops being an independent professional gatekeeper. It starts to look like an arm of the government.15 Malaysian Bar Circular No 002/2026, ‘Serious Concerns over Bill No. 2 – Ministerial Appointment of a Majority of LPQB Members’, ‘Power to Remove Members without Assigning Reasons’, and ‘Ministerial Control over Pay and Perks’.
[14]. If you want to become a lawyer, you will soon be knocking on a door whose key is effectively in the Minister’s pocket. And if you are a lawyer who specialises in suing the government, you may find that tomorrow’s entry requirements for your juniors are set by the very people you spend your days challenging.
B. “Audit” concerns used as a red herring
[15]. Yes, the LPQB went years without an audit, but that was because the original LPA simply did not require one; it was a governance gap, not proof of criminal misconduct.16 Ibid, ‘Misinformation and Disinformation’, noting that historic lack of audit was due to the statutory framework, and that s 9A now mandates audits. The gap has already been closed by section 9A, which makes annual audits compulsory under the Auditor‑General’s watch.
[16]. Using a past audit issue – now fixed – to justify permanent government control over legal education is like saying that because your car once had a flat tyre, you should hand your car keys to the neighbour—forever.
C. Diluting the Bar and Judiciary
[17]. Previously, the Bar and the Judiciary together held three out of five seats – a clear relative majority, and a sensible balance between the profession, the courts, and the Attorney General.17 Letter to the Prime Minister, paras 2–3; Malaysian Bar Circular No 002/2026, discussion of previous composition. Now, even with one extra Bar representative, their combined seats drop to four out of thirteen.18 Malaysian Bar Circular No 002/2026, ‘Dilution of Representation from the Judiciary and the Malaysian Bar’.
[18]. No convincing explanation has been given for why those who actually practise in and oversee the courts should be reduced, while political influence is “turbo‑charged.”19 Ibid, noting absence of justification for reducing judicial and Bar representation while retaining the Attorney General as Chair.
D. Questionable use of ‘representation’ from Sabah and Sarawak
[19]. Giving Sabah and Sarawak seats may sound fair, but the current structure produces a bizarre imbalance. The Malaysian Bar has roughly 25,000 members, while Sabah Law Society and the Advocates Association of Sarawak each have around 1,000 members.20 Malaysian Bar Circular No 002/2026, ‘Inclusion of Sabah and Sarawak in the LPQB’, noting approximate membership numbers. Yet each gets one seat and the Malaysian Bar only two.21 Ibid, explaining that a proportionate allocation would give the Malaysian Bar far more seats than 2 if Sabah and Sarawak each have 1. If 1,000 members gets one seat, how many seats do you think 25,000 members deserve?
[20]. Worse, Sabah and Sarawak are not actually bound by the LPA itself. They have their own set of laws. Entry into the Sabah and Sarawak bar is not exclusively controlled by the LPQB. The LPQB’s rules for the CLP is only one pathway among several for admission in their own jurisdictions: English and Australian Bar exams, for example, plus graduation from local universities.22 Ibid, explaining that the LPA does not apply to Sabah and Sarawak, but they have chosen to recognise the CLP as a qualifying route Giving full voting power over LPQB to parties not fully bound by its consequences, while shrinking the voice of those who are, is not ‘representation’ – there is another suitable word in English for it: it is called “distortion”.
VI. How other Commonwealth countries do it
[21]. In most mature British Commonwealth systems, the bodies that decide who becomes a lawyer are either independent professional regulators, courts, or arms-length statutory bodies with clear safeguards against political interference.23 comparison with England & Wales, Australia, Singapore and Hong Kong
(a). England & Wales rely on independent regulators such as the Solicitors Regulation Authority and the Bar Standards Board, with the Legal Services Board providing oversight; ministers do not hand‑pick a majority of those deciding who qualifies as a barrister or solicitor24 International Bar and regulatory overviews summarised in ICLR, ‘Malaysia’ jurisdiction page, which contrasts independent regulatory structures in Commonwealth systems.
(b). Australia places admission under the control of state Supreme Courts and independent legal admissions boards, again without ministers directly controlling appointments and removals of a majority of members.25 Ibid, drawing on comparative Commonwealth professional regulation models.
(c). Singapore and Hong Kong maintain significant judicial and professional control over admission standards, with government involved but not holding a free hand to “stack and sack” the qualifying bodies.26 Ibid, noting separation between political control and professional regulation in key Commonwealth jurisdictions.
[22]. If Bill No. 2 stands, Malaysia will move away from this mainstream model of an independent profession and towards something closer to ‘politically-managed entry’ to the Malaysian Bar.
VII. What this means for ordinary Malaysians
[23]. Imagine a young law graduate, Aisyah. She does well at university, passes her qualifying exams, and starts to speak up about corruption in a government-linked company. She writes articles, she helps NGOs, she becomes a familiar name.
[24]. Now imagine that the Board which decides whether she can qualify as a lawyer is dominated by members appointed and removable by a Minister who does not like ‘troublemakers’ i.e. those who question the government. The Board controls qualifying pathways, recognition of foreign law degrees, and the rules of the Certificate in Legal Practice.27 Legal Profession Act 1976, read with LPQB’s mandate as described in Malaysian Bar Circular No 002/2026 With the stroke of a pen, the Board can tweak criteria, change recognition rules, or “reform” pathways in ways that quietly shut doors to people like Aisyah.
[25]. The danger is not that every Minister will behave badly; the danger is that the law now allows a bad Minister to do so. When lawyers know that their entire pipeline – from law school to admission – depends on a Board under government control, fewer will dare to specialise in public-interest litigation against the government.28 Malaysian Bar Circular No 002/2026, ‘Principles’ and ‘Next Steps’, warning that government encroachment into legal education threatens professional independence and the rule of law.
[26]. Over time, ordinary citizens will find fewer independent lawyers willing to take tough cases, and public confidence in the courts will quietly erode.
VIII. What genuine reform would look like
[27]. The choice is not between chaos and government control. There is a third way: real reform without ‘political capture’. Genuine improvement of standards could include:
(a). More rigorous, transparent CLP and qualifying exams, with published syllabuses, pass rates, and independent quality assurance.
(b). Better, structured pupillage with minimum training standards and clear supervision rules.
(c). Transparent, objective criteria for recognizing local and foreign law degrees, published and open to review.
(d). Stronger oversight of the LPQB through mandatory annual audits (already provided for by section 9A LPA) and reporting to Parliament, without giving the Minister power to pack and fire the Board.29 Malaysian Bar Circular No 002/2026, ‘Misinformation and Disinformation’, highlighting s 9A and the Bar’s support for independent financial oversight.
[28]. In fact, the Malaysian Bar has already proposed that it should chair the LPQB and has pledged to manage operational expenditure and reduce fees for CLP students – a concrete way to improve both governance and affordability without turning the Board into a political playground.30 Malaysian Bar Circular No 002/2026, ‘Actions Undertaken by the Bar Council’, noting Bar’s proposal to chair LPQB and to reduce costs and fees.
IX. What this says about our politics
[29]. A government that is confident in its own integrity does not need to control the profession that might one day sue it. A government that believes in the rule of law does not need to dominate the Board that decides who can appear in court.
[30]. Here, the government was warned repeatedly. The Bar wrote detailed submissions as early as May 2025, held meetings with ministers and MPs, issued press statements, and even appealed directly to the Prime Minister to reconsider the amendments and allow genuine consultation.31 Malaysian Bar Circular No 002/2026, ‘Chronology of Actions Undertaken by the Malaysian Bar to Oppose the Legal Profession (Amendment) Bill (No. 2) 2025’; Letter to the Prime Minister dated 1 Dec 2025. The Bill was nevertheless pushed through in haste, in total disregard of the Bar’s objections.32 Malaysian Bar Circular No 002/2026, ‘The Legal Profession Qualifying Board: Executive Encroachment and Other Non Sequiturs’, noting passage of Bill No. 2 despite Bar objections.
[31]. Voters should quietly ask themselves: if a government is willing to weaken the independence of lawyers today, what will it be willing to do tomorrow, when criticism gets louder and cases against it multiply?
[32]. You do not need slogans to answer that question.
[33]. You only need to remember that the next time you stand alone against power – as a worker, consumer, or citizen – you will want a lawyer whose profession is not controlled by the very politicians you are challenging.
X. Say “No” while you still can
[34]. The LPQB amendments are not some technical adjustment that only concerns lawyers. They are a deliberate shift of power over legal education and entry to the Bar into the hands of politicians.33 Malaysian Bar Circular No 002/2026, overall analysis of Bill No. 2 as expanding Executive influence over LPQB composition, finances and decision‑making.
[35]. They threaten the independence of the legal profession, the quality of justice—and ultimately the ability of ordinary Malaysians to find fearless counsel.
XI. Keys, once handed over, are rarely returned
[36]. If we allow the government to hold the keys to the legal profession, we should not be surprised when the door to justice starts to close – slowly, quietly, and firmly – right in front of us.
∞§∞
We thank GR Stocks of Unsplash for the image.
The author thanks Miss KN Geetha, Miss TP Vaani, Miss JN Lheela and Lydia Jaynthi.
@Copyright reserved.
All content on this site, including but not limited to text, compilation, graphics, documents, and layouts, is the intellectual property of GK Ganesan Kasinathan and is protected by local and international copyright laws. Any use shall be invalid unless written permission is obtained by writing to gk@gkganesan.com
