On the 31st of March 2026, the Singapore High Court handed down a judgment that ought to interest every Malaysian lawyer — and every person who has ever left their property in someone else’s hands.¹ Steven Kurniawan Prayitno v Oh Chin Ann & 2 Ors [2026] SGHC 70, decided by Chan Seng Onn SJ, General Division of the High Court of the Republic of Singapore, 31 March 2026. Full judgment accessible at https://www.elitigation.sg/gd/s/2026_SGHC_70

The plaintiff owned fourteen vintage and rare cars. He had engaged two defendants to import those cars from the United Kingdom into Singapore, and then export them onward to Indonesia. The cars sat in storage. The storage fees mounted. The defendants, not receiving payment, sold the cars to recover their costs.² Steven Kurniawan Prayitno v Oh Chin Ann & 2 Ors [2026] SGHC 70, at [8]-[15]. The fourteen cars included Porsches and Mercedes-Benz models. The combined sale proceeds were SGD $348,000.

The plaintiff sued. The first two defendants were found liable. The third was not.

The result is unremarkable. What has sparked a real intellectual fire is not the outcome, but the route — specifically, the court’s use of an ancient doctrine called bailment.

The word sounds medieval. It is.

A “bailment” is the delivery of goods by one person to another—for a purpose—on the understanding that the goods will eventually be returned or disposed of as directed.³ Section 101, Contracts Act 1950 (Act 136, Malaysia), Part IX: “A ‘bailment’ is the delivery of goods by one person to another for some purpose, upon a contract that they shall, when the purpose is accomplished, be returned or otherwise disposed of according to the directions of the person delivering them.” This is a direct adoption of Section 148 of the Indian Contract Act 1872, which reads in identical terms

In plain words: you hand over your property; someone looks after it; they hand it back.

The person who hands over the goods is the bailor. The person who receives them is the bailee.

The examples are all around us. You leave your car with a valet parking attendant.⁴ The Indian Supreme Court confirmed in MR Krishna Murthi v New India Assurance Co Ltd (2019) that valet parking constitutes a bailment. See also Section 104, Contracts Act 1950, on the duty of care of the bailee. You send your jacket to the dry cleaner. You place your gold jewellery in a bank safe deposit box. All bailments.

The law of bailment in Malaysia is codified in Part IX of the Contracts Act 1950, from Section 101 to Section 134.⁵ Contracts Act 1950 (Act 136, Malaysia), Part IX — Of Bailment, Sections 101–134. These provisions are substantially a direct re-enactment of Part IX of the Indian Contract Act 1872 (Sections 148–181). Both Acts trace their ancestry to the common law principles articulated in Coggs v Bernard (1703) 2 Ld Raym 909. ^. These provisions are, word for word, copies of Part IX of the Indian Contracts Act 1872. Both, in turn, trace their roots to English common law.

To understand why bailment matters, we must go back to 1703.

A man called Coggs entrusted two barrels of brandy to a man called Bernard, to be transported across London. Free of charge — no payment. Bernard’s servants were careless. The brandy spilled. Coggs sued.⁶ Coggs v Bernard (1703) 2 Ld Raym 909, 92 Eng Rep 107, decided by Holt CJ in the Court of King’s Bench. This case overturned Southcote’s Case (1601), which had imposed strict liability on all general bailees.

The Chief Justice, Sir John Holt, could not use contract law. There was no consideration. No payment. No contract.

So Holt CJ set out—with lasting clarity—six categories of bailment, each carrying a different standard of care.⁷ Coggs v Bernard (1703) 2 Ld Raym 909 at 912-913. The six categories run from (1) bare naked bailment for the bailor’s use to (6) carriage without reward, the situation before the court. The gratuitous bailee (holding goods free, for the bailor’s benefit) owes a high duty of care; the bailee for reward owes the ordinary standard of a prudent man.^. His reasoning was simple and enduring⁸ Per Holt CJ in Coggs v Bernard (1703) 2 Ld Raym 909 at 915. :

If I entrust my property to you, and you undertake to care for it, and then you are careless — you have let me down. The law holds you to your word.

This principle sits in our own Contracts Act 1950 at Section 104: the bailee must take as much care of the goods as a man of ordinary prudence would take of his own.⁹ Section 104, Contracts Act 1950: “The bailee is bound to take as much care of the goods bailed to him as a man of ordinary prudence would, under similar circumstances, take of his own goods of the same bulk, quality, and value as the goods bailed.” Mirror provision: Section 151, Indian Contract Act 1872.

The defendants in the Singapore case did not dispute that they were bailees.¹⁰ 2026] SGHC 70, at [35]-[36]. The first defendant admitted in his own affidavit that he was a bailee. The court held both the first and second defendants to be joint bailees personally liable to the plaintiff. Their argument was different: they claimed there was an implied agreement entitling them to sell the cars if storage fees went unpaid.

The court rejected this. A bailee cannot exclude or restrict his common law duties except by an express stipulation — clearly brought home to the bailor and assented to.¹¹ 2026] SGHC 70, at [39]-[41], following Harling v Eddy [1951] 2 KB 739 at 748 and Yasuda Fire & Marine Insurance Co of Europe Ltd v Orion Marine Insurance Underwriting Agency Ltd [1995] QB 174 at 220. The principle requires an express, affirmative acceptance of any restriction on the bailee’s duty—silence and implication will not do.

There was no such express term. There was no clear, unambiguous consent to any right of sale. The defendants had, in the court’s finding, simply assumed a right that was never given to them.

As Shakespeare observed—in a different context, but with pointed relevance—“He that filches from me my good name robs me of that which not enriches him and makes me poor indeed.”¹² William Shakespeare, Othello, Act III, Scene 3 (Iago to Othello). The sentiment applies equally to another’s property: treating what belongs to another as one’s own, under colour of recovering a debt, is no remedy known to the law. One may say the same of a man’s cars. Taking what is not yours—even to recover a debt—is not a right that the law recognises without clear authorisation.

The court also found, importantly, that the storage fees were payable only upon delivery in Indonesia.¹³ [2026] SGHC 70, at [52]-[59]. The court’s construction of the 2016 oral agreement was that the plaintiff’s obligation to pay fees arose upon delivery in Indonesia, not before. Since delivery had not occurred, the precondition for payment had not been met, and there was no entitlement to sell the cars. Delivery had not occurred. The precondition for payment had not been met. The sale was doubly unauthorised.

Here is where the judgment has stirred the academic hornets’ nest.

The court went beyond contract. It also held that the defendants had breached their duties as bailees, citing the English authority of Morris v CW Martin & Sons Ltd¹⁴ Morris v CW Martin & Sons Ltd [1965] 2 All ER 725 (CA), per Lord Diplock at 734-735: “The legal relationship of bailor and bailee of a chattel can exist independently of any contract.” In that case, a sub-bailee (a dry cleaner) was held liable to the original owner of a mink coat — notwithstanding no contract between them. for the proposition that a bailee’s duties can arise independently of any contract.

Dr David Gibbs-Kneller of the University of East Anglia took sharp exception.¹⁵ David Gibbs-Kneller, “‘A Rule Adumbrated’: Bailment on Terms and the Rule of Law” (2023) 139 Law Quarterly Review 592. The article argues that bailment on terms duplicates contract law because both rest on the same justificatory principle—consent. It contends that the rule is “contrary to the rule of law because like cases are not treated alike.” In his 2023 Law Quarterly Review article—and in his commentary on this very Singapore judgment—he argues that where there is a complete contract, the contractual analysis is sufficient. Bailment, superimposed on top, adds nothing. It is—in his memorable phrase—as useful as admitting you are a unicorn.

His deeper thesis: bailment is a conceptually redundant doctrine. Where there is a contract, the contract governs. Where there is no contract, the law of tort covers the ground. Bailment is an unnecessary third wheel, generating uncertain obligations without a principled foundation.

Let us be direct. The critic has a point on the facts of this case.

On the Singapore facts, the contractual analysis was entirely sufficient.¹⁶ [2026] SGHC 70, at [66] and [101]. The court found concurrent liability in both contract and bailment. The contractual prohibition on sale without consent was, however, sufficient to determine the issue. The bailment finding, on these particular facts, was arguably additional to what was strictly necessary. The defendants had no right to sell the cars. That was enough. Piling bailment on top of a complete contract analysis adds clutter, not clarity.

The critic is also right that the “voluntary assumption of possession” test is underdeveloped. The courts have deployed it for centuries without fully explaining why possession alone—voluntarily assumed—should generate enforceable legal obligations.¹⁷ 2026] SGHC 70, at [110], citing Alwie Handoyo v Tjong Very Sumito [2013] 4 SLR 308 at [143], which relied on Palmer on Bailment (Sweet & Maxwell, 3rd Ed, 2009) — the leading text by N E Palmer on the subject.

But the critic overstates his case when he suggests that bailment should be dissolved into contract and tort.

Consider sub-bailment. A bails goods to B. B sub-bails to C. A has no contract with C. C negligently destroys the goods. On the critic’s theory, A has no claim against C. There is no contract. Tort does not readily impose a duty to return goods. A is left without a remedy against the very person who caused the loss.¹⁸ Morris v CW Martin & Sons Ltd [1965] 2 All ER 725, at 734-735, per Lord Diplock. See also The Pioneer Container [1994] 2 AC 324 (PC), per Lord Goff, confirming that a sub-bailee comes under a duty to the original bailor — irrespective of any contract — by voluntarily assuming possession of goods belonging to another.

The common law has always refused that conclusion. And it is right to do so.

In Malaysia, bailment without contract is not merely a theoretical possibility. The finder of a lost wallet owes duties to the true owner.¹⁹ The duty of a finder is recognised at common law and under the general principles applicable in Malaysia via Section 3 of the Civil Law Act 1956. A finder who voluntarily assumes possession of another’s goods becomes a gratuitous bailee. The person who, in an emergency, takes a neighbour’s injured animal to a veterinarian owes duties of care in bailment—with no contract, no consideration, and no formality whatsoever.

Bailment occupies the space that contract cannot reach. That space is real.

Malaysian practitioners have particular reason to study this debate.

Part IX of the Contracts Act 1950—Sections 101 to 134—is our complete statutory code of bailment. It defines bailment, the bailee’s duty of care, the bailor’s rights, the liability for unauthorised use, and the duty to return goods upon termination.²⁰ Contracts Act 1950 (Act 136), Sections 101-134. Key provisions: s.101 (definition and parties); s.104 (bailee’s standard of care); s.106 (termination by inconsistent act of bailee); s.107 (liability for unauthorised use); s.113 (duty to return on accomplishment of purpose); s.114 (liability for failure to return). The corresponding provisions in the Indian Contract Act 1872 are Sections 148-181.

These provisions are mirrored in Sections 148 to 181 of the Indian Contracts Act 1872. Decades of Indian case law on these provisions — directly persuasive in our courts — confirms that the statutory code supplements, and does not replace, the common law of bailment.²¹ The Indian Supreme Court in New India Assurance Co Ltd v Shanti Misra AIR 1975 SC 1830 confirmed that the Indian Contract Act’s bailment provisions co-exist with common law principles. Malaysian courts apply this approach: see the discussion of Palmer on Bailment in Singapore cases such as The Jeil Crystal [2024] 4 SLR 1691, which are of persuasive authority in Malaysia.

The lesson from Singapore is practical, not merely academic.

Every client who stores goods with a warehouseman, a shipping agent, a workshop, or a parking facility is a bailor. The bailee owes duties. Those duties survive even a poorly drafted contract. They cannot be quietly extinguished by an “implied agreement” that was never made explicit.²² William Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice, Act V, Scene 1 (Portia). The “little candle” is a well-drawn, written agreement. It illuminates what would otherwise remain dark and disputed — and saves the parties from the expense of litigation.

A clearly drafted, written bailment agreement is that candle. The fourteen cars in Singapore should have taught us that. Put. It. In. Writing.

The critic raises questions that legal scholars must continue to debate. The conceptual foundations of bailment are imperfect, and honest scholars admit it.

But the answer to imperfect foundations is refinement—not demolition.

Bailment exists because life is messier than contract theory. People lose things. People find things. People entrust things down long chains of custody—from owner to agent to sub-agent—without a written contract for each link. The doctrine of bailment fills those gaps. It has done so for three centuries.

The Singapore court was right. The first two defendants had no right to sell those cars.²³ Steven Kurniawan Prayitno v Oh Chin Ann & 2 Ors [2026] SGHC 70, at [3]. The court found both the first and second defendants jointly and severally liable in bailment for 13 of the 14 cars. The second defendant was additionally liable in contract. The plaintiff may elect between an inquiry into damages and an account of the proceeds of sale: at [115]. They were bailees. They breached their duty. The plaintiff is entitled to his remedy.

As for the unicorn: it does not exist. Bailment does. And on the day you find a stranger’s wallet on the floor of a shopping mall, you will be very glad that it does.²⁴ A finder of lost property who voluntarily takes it into his custody is a bailee at common law: see Armory v Delamirie (1722) 1 Stra 505, where a chimney sweep’s boy who found a jewel was held entitled to bring an action in trover against a goldsmith who refused to return it. The possessor’s right—and duty—under bailment law is thus centuries old.

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This article is written for a general readership and does not constitute legal advice. Readers with legal questions on bailment and property law are encouraged to seek independent legal advice.

 We thank Clem Onojeghuo of Unsplash for the image.

The author thanks Miss KN Geetha, Miss Lydia Jaynthi, Miss TP Vaani and Miss JN Lheela.

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