Everybody loves the idea of limits – until those limits apply to them

So it is with the ten‑year cap on the office of prime minister.

In February 2026, the government tabled a Bill to amend Article 43 of the Federal Constitution.¹Constitution (Amendment) Bill 2026, Dewan Rakyat, First Reading, 22 February 2026.

It would have been the first explicit term limit for a head of government anywhere in the Westminster world.²Lu Wei Hoong, ‘Malaysia PM term limit amendment fails in Parliament’, The Straits Times (2 March 2026).

Parliament came within two votes of passing it – and failed.³Ibid.

What can we learn from that failure?

And if the Bill returns, how should we improve it?

What does the Bill actually do?

The Bill adds a handful of clauses to Article 43.

They do three simple things.

First, they cap any one person’s time as prime minister at “ten years in the aggregate, either continuously or otherwise”.⁴Constitution (Amendment) Bill 2026, cl 2 inserting art 43(2a).

Past service counts towards that ten‑year limit.⁵Ibid, proposed art 43(4d)(a).

Second, when the ten‑year mark is reached, the prime minister must vacate office.

The cabinet falls with him or her.⁶Ibid, proposed arts 43(4a)–(4b).

They remain only as a caretaker government, to run the administration from day to day until a new prime minister is appointed.⁷Ibid, proposed art 43(4c).

Third, the Bill explains how to calculate the ten years.

Caretaker time after a dissolution of Parliament does not count.⁸Ibid, proposed art 43(4d)(b).

On paper, it is a narrow reform.

It does not change elections, dissolutions, or votes of confidence.

It simply stops one individual from holding the keys to Putrajaya beyond ten years.

Does tabling this Bill prove courage?

The government says it shows its “political will” to reform.⁹Bernama, ‘Bill To Limit PM’s Tenure To 10 Years Tabled For First Reading’ (22 February 2026).

There is some truth in that.

Most prime ministers do not volunteer to shorten their own potential careers.

But courage is not shown by a press conference.

It is shown by doing the hard, dull work of persuasion.

By redrafting clauses that worry genuine critics.

By building a two‑thirds majority for a rule that will bind friend and foe alike.

And there is more to it than meets the eye.

We must look at what actually happened in the House.

In March, the government could not muster the numbers.

Forty‑four MPs abstained.

Thirty‑two did not even turn up.¹⁰’Malaysia PM term limit amendment fails in Parliament’ (n above).

So real commitment must mean more than tabling a Bill and holding a press conference.

First and foremost, the government owes the public an honest explanation: why were MPs from ruling parties missing or abstaining when a central plank of the reform agenda came to the vote?¹¹Reuters, ‘Malaysia’s parliament fails to pass bill limiting PM’s tenure to two terms’ (2 March 2026).

If ministers say the reform is vital, but their own back‑benchers stay away, the public is entitled to ask whether the courage is real, or merely rhetorical.¹²Asia News Network, ‘Bill to limit Malaysian PM tenure fails to get two-thirds majority in lower house’ (3 March 2026).

Real commitment also means listening to critics and improving the Bill.

It means serious engagement with opposition parties to secure cross‑party support, so that the rule will outlast any one government.¹³Channel NewsAsia, ‘Why did a landmark Bill to limit the tenure of a Malaysian PM fail and what’s next?’ (4 March 2026).

Above all, it means following through until a sound version of the amendment actually becomes law – and is then honoured in practice, not just in speeches.

How is the ten‑year limit counted?

The idea is simple.

If you have held the office of prime minister for ten years in total, you are done.

The Bill counts:

(a). all time as prime minister, before and after the amendment; but

(b). excludes the time after dissolution when you merely “perform the functions” of prime minister until a new cabinet is sworn in.¹⁴Constitution (Amendment) Bill 2026, proposed art 43(4d).

So far so good.

Yet, as any lawyer will tell you, trouble lives in the gaps.

What if someone is appointed for only a week during a hung Parliament?

What if the ten‑year mark is crossed half‑way through a term?

Must that prime minister resign at once?

Or may he or she remain until the next dissolution?

The Bill is silent.

That silence invites argument.

And argument, in a crisis, can be dangerous.

The cure is easy.

The Constitution could say that time is counted in days (including part‑days).

It could say that any appointment as prime minister counts.

It could also say that once the ten years are reached, the prime minister must promptly tender the cabinet’s resignation.

No more games.

No more guesswork.

Does the Bill cut down the King’s powers?

Opposition leaders argued that the Bill “fetters” the Yang di‑Pertuan Agong.¹⁵Hamzah Zainuddin, parliamentary debate on Constitution (Amendment) Bill 2026, 29 February 2026; reported in ConstitutionNet, ‘Malaysia’s parliament fails to pass constitutional amendment limiting prime minister’s term’ (2 March 2026).

They said it intrudes on His Majesty’s discretion to appoint, under Article 43(2)(a), the MP who in his judgment is likely to command the confidence of the majority.¹⁶Federal Constitution, art 43(2)(a).

That is a serious charge.

But is it sound?

A written constitution may always redefine its own offices.

Parliament may, by the special procedure in Article 159, change the qualifications for high office – age, citizenship, and, yes, maximum tenure.¹⁷Federal Constitution, art 159; G. Kadarisan, ‘Can a court change the language of a written constitution?’ GK Legal (23 July 2025).

If the amendment is validly made, the King’s discretion is simply exercised within those new boundaries.

He remains free to choose any MP who commands confidence – so long as that person is not disqualified by the Constitution itself.

So the real legal issue is not “encroachment”.

It is whether the amendment is passed by the proper super‑majority, and whether the Conference of Rulers should be consulted as a matter of prudence and convention.¹⁸Federal Constitution, arts 38, 159.

Still, perception matters.

A short clause could easily say:

“Subject to the limitation in Clause (2a), nothing in this Article shall be taken to affect the discretion of the Yang di‑Pertuan Agong under Clause (2)(a).”

That one sentence would calm many fears.

Can the amendment be circumvented?

This is the uncomfortable question.

It is also the most important.

A clever lawyer can read the Bill and stay within its literal words.

A clever politician can do much more.

Imagine this.

A long‑serving prime minister hits his ten‑year limit.

He steps down, as the Constitution requires.

The party, however, immediately elects him as president or “supreme leader”.

He then selects a loyal protégé as prime minister.

Cabinet lists are drawn up at his home.

Policy is decided in his office.

The new prime minister is a face, not a force.

On paper, the Constitution is obeyed.

In reality, an unelected kingmaker rules from the shadows.¹⁹’Presidential term limits help protect democracy – long ones can be dangerous’, The Conversation (29 November 2024).

A second scenario.

Two or three leaders alternate as prime minister.

Each serves just under the ten‑year line.

An inner circle remains in charge for decades.

The public sees “change”.

The substance is monopoly.

This is what people mean by “musical chairs”.

The chairs change.

The orchestra never does.

Why the constitutions of political parties matter

The Federal Constitution cannot rewrite party constitutions.

It cannot decide who leads UMNO, PKR, DAP, PAS, or any other party.

Yet those party offices decide who becomes prime minister and who may bring down a government.²⁰Malaysian Bar, ‘MyConstitution: Making the law’ (23 September 2010).

If parties keep lifetime leaders who can no longer be prime minister, power will move out of public view, into inner councils and “advisory” bodies.

The risk is not just legal circumvention.

It is democratic decay.

There is a simple answer.

Parties should reform themselves.

They can set their own term limits for presidents and chairmen.

They can require that a former prime minister who has hit the ten‑year cap cannot again hold the top party office.

They can democratise the process by which they nominate a candidate for prime minister – through internal elections, transparent rules, and independent vetting.

Without such changes, a constitutional term limit is a lock on the wrong door.

The key will still sit in the same pocket.

How do other nations handle this?

In presidential systems, term limits are common.

The United States caps the president at two four‑year terms.²¹US Constitution, amend XXII.

South Korea allows a single five‑year term.²²Constitution of the Republic of Korea, art 70.

In those systems, the president is both head of state and head of government.

A hard cap makes sense.

In Westminster‑style systems, written term limits for prime ministers are almost unknown.

The UK, Australia, New Zealand, India, Singapore and the Nordic states rely on politics, not constitutional text.²³’List of political term limits’, Wikipedia; ‘Political Term Limits by Country 2026’, World Population Review.

Parties depose leaders who stay too long.

Coalitions shift.

Voters punish arrogance.

Malaysia is trying something new.

We are importing a presidential‑style term cap into a party‑dominated parliamentary system.²⁴ConstitutionNet, ‘Malaysia’s parliament fails to pass constitutional amendment limiting prime minister’s term’ (2 March 2026).

That is not wrong.

But it is incomplete.

The lesson from abroad is clear.

A written term limit works only when two other things are in place:

(a). strong institutions to enforce the rule; and

(b). political parties that accept real leadership change.

We must build both.

What should happen next?

When the Bill returns – and ministers say it will – Parliament should do three things.

First, improve the drafting.

Clarify how to count time.

State exactly what happens when the ten‑year mark is reached.

Protect the King’s discretion in plain words.

Second, widen the debate.

A term limit is not a silver bullet.

We need stronger checks on concentration of power: transparent political funding, a real separation between prime minister and finance minister, and a more muscular Parliament.²⁵See, for example, G. Kadarisan, ‘Who guards the Guardians? What happens when the PM has the power to pick judges but is in conflict?’ GK Legal (13 July 2025).

Third, look beyond the Constitution.

Ask the parties, “Will you change your own rules?”

Without that, ten years on the clock will not mean ten years of genuine renewal.

The question is no longer whether we should limit the premiership.

It is whether we have the courage – and the consistency – to make that limit real.

∞§∞

We thank Imkara Visual of Unsplash for the image.

The author thanks Miss KN Geetha, Miss Lydia Jaynthi, Miss TP Vaani and Miss JN Lheela.

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