[This is the second part of a two-part article on joint liability and personal insolvency law:  See Part-1 here]

In 1976, a judge in Seremban said no.

In 1999, a judge in Shah Alam met a near relation of the question and said yes. He did not follow the Seremban judge. He did not need to. Neither court sat above the other.

No appellate court has settled it since. Creditors keep asking it. Debtors keep winning and losing on it.¹No appellate decision on the validity of a joint creditors’ notice has been found on CLJLaw, Lexis (Malaysia) or Westlaw as at 9 October 2026.

Part 1 asked whether a creditor may pursue one of two joint debtors for the whole. The answer was yes, and for partners the statute points the same way. This part asks the reverse. What if the creditors are two?

THE WORDS THAT STARTED IT

The bankruptcy notice is the creditor’s opening move. It is served on the debtor, who then has a short time to pay or answer.

Section 3(1)(i) of the Insolvency Act 1967 says the notice is issued by ‘a creditor’. One creditor. The singular is the whole of the trouble.²Insolvency Act 1967 (Act 360), s 3(1)(i), whose proviso treats a person ‘for the time being entitled to enforce’ the judgment as a creditor. The Part V numbering differs between the commercial reprint and the Attorney General’s Chambers reprint; the reference here is to s 3.

Yet when the petition is presented, section 5(1)(a) speaks of ‘two or more creditors’. Parliament knew how to write the plural. It wrote it for the petition, and left the notice alone.³Insolvency Act 1967, s 5(1)(a).

That contrast is the engine of the whole dispute.

SEREMBAN, 1976

Three suits were consolidated. A default judgment followed, in one document. The judgment stated a separate sum for each creditor. The two creditors served a single notice, demanding RM96,250 ‘to each’.

Ajaib Singh J reasoned in four short steps. The Act says ‘a creditor’. Section 5(1)(a) shows Parliament could say ‘two or more’ and did so only for the petition. The rules were strict and to be read literally. So a notice may issue at the instance of one creditor, and only one.⁴Michael Chong Ngian Fong v Syarikat Fong Sam Timber [1977] 1 MLJ 263 (HC Seremban, Ajaib Singh J, 30 January 1976). The judge also held the notice bad on a separate ground, because blanks had been left for interest and no liquidated sum was demanded.

It is a clean piece of reasoning. Whether it is correct is another matter.

SHAH ALAM, 1999

Two co-owners were awarded damages together, as one undivided sum. They issued one notice in both names.

Chin Fook Yen J upheld it. He began where the Seremban judge had not. The Interpretation Acts say that words in the singular include the plural, unless the context forbids. ‘A creditor’ therefore includes ‘creditors’. He drew support, by analogy, from a firm-name case decided in England in 1921.⁵Re Wah Hai Hing, ex p Choong Wai Wah [1999] 5 MLJ 651; [1999] MLJU 183 (HC Shah Alam, Chin Fook Yen J, 27 April 1999), declining to follow Michael Chong (n 4). The reliance on Re Hill [1921] 2 KB 831 is by analogy only: that case concerned a retired partner and a firm name, not co-owners.

Here is the difficulty. The Interpretation Acts do say that. But they also say it yields where the context is ‘inconsistent with or repugnant to’ the plural.⁶Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967, s 4(3) and s 2(3)(b), as discussed in Wah Hai Hing (n 5).

Was the contrast with section 5(1)(a) such a context? That was the Seremban judge’s argument. The Shah Alam judge, with respect, did not meet it. And the Seremban judge never met the Interpretation Acts.

Two judges. Two half-answers. Neither heard the other’s case.

THE FEDERAL COURT’S QUIET ASSUMPTION

The Federal Court has since walked past the question. It did not trip.

Eight lenders held one judgment. The judgment set out what each was owed. They issued one notice, ‘jointly’, and presented one petition. One lender later wished to leave, having been paid.

The Federal Court refused. The lenders had ‘elected to proceed collectively on the strength of a single judgment’, and ‘must live with their election’. The Act is a complete code, and it gave no way out.⁷AmBank (M) Bhd v Lim Sue Beng [2019] 4 MLJ 701; [2019] 7 CLJ 289 (FC, 15 May 2019), majority at [17], [19] and [29] (Azahar Mohamed FCJ; Rohana Yusuf FCJ and Mohd Zawawi Salleh FCJ agreeing; Balia Yusof Wahi FCJ having retired, judgment was delivered under s 78 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964; Alizatul Khair FCJ dissenting). The figure of eight lenders is taken from the Court of Appeal’s report, Lim Sue Beng v RHB Bank Bhd [2018] 3 CLJ 106 (CA) [5]. Neither Michael Chong nor Wah Hai Hing is cited in either judgment.

Notice what the Court did not say. It did not say the joint notice was valid. The question put to it was a different one.⁸The dissent records that the debtor’s earlier application to set aside the bankruptcy notice had failed in the High Court and, on 31 March 2014, in the Court of Appeal: AmBank (n 7) [48], [52] (Alizatul Khair FCJ, dissenting). The report does not show whether the single-notice point was argued on that occasion, and I have not traced a report of those decisions. A premise left untested is not a premise that has been decided.

Now see the trap. Under Michael Chong, creditors may not join. Under AmBank, once joined, they may not part. A creditor who joins breaks the first rule. A creditor who wants to leave breaks the second.

The dissenting judge saw the absurdity. If every settlement with one lender forced a fresh notice, she observed, the result would be ‘an absurd situation’.⁹AmBank (n 7) [86]–[87] (Alizatul Khair FCJ, dissenting), adding that the joint judgment and the single notice had ‘not been impugned by the court’.

Alizatul Khair FCJ began from the Malaysian Act’s English ancestors, the Bankruptcy Acts of 1914 and 1883, and read the old cases in that light.¹⁰AmBank (n 7) [66]–[72] and [77]–[78] (Alizatul Khair FCJ, dissenting), citing Ex p Dearle, re Hastings (1884) 14 QBD 184 (CA) and Ex p Owen, re Owen (1884) 13 QBD 113 (CA), which the report prints as 15 QBD 113. The report lists Dearle as distinguished and Owen as referred to by the majority. Practitioners and students would do well to begin at [66] of her judgment and read on to [87]: twenty-two paragraphs, in the report at [2019] 7 CLJ 289.

2026: THE HIGH COURT PULLS TWO WAYS

Two High Court decisions of March 2026 show the strain, and they must be treated here as questions of law only.

In one, a notice was issued by twenty-six judgment creditors. When some were dropped from the petition, the petition and the bankruptcy order were set aside, on the authority of AmBank. An appeal to the Court of Appeal has been noticed, and no decision had been found as at 13 October 2026.¹¹Re Dinesh Kanavaji, ex p Saling [2026] MLJU 1109; [2026] CLJU 861 (HC Kuala Lumpur, 27 March 2026). The Court of Appeal appeals (Enclosures 381 to 383) were last checked on 9 October 2026 with no outcome found; on 13 October 2026 no Court of Appeal decision in the matter was found on CLJLaw. Because an appeal is pending, this essay addresses only the point of law.

In the other, a representative action had produced a collective judgment. The notice, issued by several creditors, was upheld. ‘Multiple judgment creditors’, the court held, may issue a single notice, because no statute forbids it.¹²Re Maslan, ex p Mohd Noor Shahral [2026] MLJU 1185; [2026] CLJU 968 (HC Shah Alam, 30 March 2026) [15]–[18]. The court relied on Wah Hai Hing (n 5) and AmBank (n 7), and did not cite Michael Chong (n 4). No appeal history has been found, and no appellate decision was found on CLJLaw on 13 October 2026.

The two can live together, because the first concerned what may be done after a notice issues and the second concerned whether it may issue. But one leans on the Federal Court for more than the Federal Court said.

That is the present law: undecided, and pulled in two directions.

HOW OTHER COURTS HAVE ANSWERED

Australia’s statute uses the same words as ours. A creditor. A person ‘for the time being entitled to enforce’. The Australian courts have long held that a notice needs the authority of all the joint creditors. The reason is not the text. It is the judgment: the right to enforce it is joint, and a joint right is exercised in the names of all.¹³Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), ss 40(1)(g), 40(3)(d), 41, 44; Australian Workers’ Union v Bowen (1946) 72 CLR 575 (HCA), read at source: the majority held invalid a notice applied for by some of the joint creditors without the authority of the others (Latham CJ at 583; Dixon J at 589–590; Williams J; Starke J dissenting). Latham CJ left open whether a creditor who offers an indemnity may proceed; Dixon J and Williams J point to consent with an indemnity, or leave to enforce, as the routes. The rule was applied in Scook v Sims Construction Pty Ltd [2004] FCAFC 306 [22] and stated for petitions in Dudzinski v Kellow [2003] FCAFC 207 [19]; see also Barranbali Pty Ltd v Pioneer Australia Pty Ltd [2021] FCAFC 100 [14]–[20] (the parties agreeing that a single joint judgment creditor has no standing to issue a notice or present a petition).

New Zealand went further, and more usefully. A High Court there has treated joint creditors as a single creditor. Payment to any one discharges the debt to all. And a defect in the notice is cured unless it has actually prejudiced the debtor.¹⁴Keller v Daisley [2022] NZHC 2080 (Associate Judge Gardiner) [20] (‘Ark and the Kellers are a single creditor’ for a notice enforcing orders made in their favour jointly). Eversons International Ltd (in liq) v Stewart [2024] NZHC 1648 (Associate Judge Paulsen) [44]–[48], [51]: a notice issued by some of the persons entitled under a costs judgment was not defective, because a joint-enforcement rule belongs to actions before judgment and payment to any one of the persons entitled operates as payment to all (Douglas v Patrick (1790) 3 TR 683); alternatively there was no prejudice, so that s 418 of the Insolvency Act 2006 (NZ) would apply. Eversons did not decide whether the obligation was joint or joint and several ([43]) and said that Keller had not decided the point ([50]). Contrast Lister v Lister [2018] NZHC 1743 [10], [12]–[14], where the Act was said to contemplate a single debtor and a single creditor, and a stranger creditor could not be joined to another’s notice. Each of the three is the decision of an Associate Judge.

England and Singapore took the simpler road. They abolished the notice for personal bankruptcy. An application is made ‘by one of the individual’s creditors or jointly by more than one of them’. Hong Kong says the same of the petition. Canada lets ‘one or more creditors’ apply. Ireland goes further: its bankruptcy summons may be granted to two or more creditors who are not partners, and the debtor must satisfy all of them. I have found no legislature that says, of creditors holding one joint debt, ‘one only’.¹⁵Insolvency Act 1986 (UK), s 264(1)(a); Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 (Singapore), s 307(1)(a)(i), read on Singapore Statutes Online, 14 October 2026; Bankruptcy Ordinance (Cap 6) (Hong Kong), s 3(1)(a); Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (Canada), s 43(1), read on the Justice Laws site, 13 October 2026; Bankruptcy Act 1988 (Ireland), s 8(2), read in the Law Reform Commission’s revised text, which is an unofficial consolidation.

Singapore’s own history is instructive. Under its former Act the statutory demand spoke of ‘a creditor’ in the singular, while the petition provisions spoke of creditors joining. One letter from two creditors, demanding different debts owed to each, was held not to be a valid demand. That is the Seremban argument in Singapore dress, but it concerned separate debts, not one joint debt.¹⁶Toh Khim Eak v United Overseas Bank Ltd & Anor [2001] 1 SLR(R) 47; [2001] SGHC 6 (Lee Seiu Kin JC, 8 January 2001), under s 62 of the Bankruptcy Act (Cap 20). It does not decide whether joint holders of one debt may demand together.

England met the lone joint creditor long ago. In 1808 Lord Ellenborough held that one of two joint creditors could not alone found a commission of bankruptcy, because nothing was owed to him alone.¹⁷Brickland v Newsome (1808) 1 Camp 474. In 2001 the Hong Kong Court of Appeal gave the same reason, and upheld one statutory demand served by all three joint judgment creditors together.¹⁸Wong Wai Lin Lana v Heung Wah Wing & Ors [2001] HKCU 487 (CA) [14].

The only modern English decision I have found concerns a petition already presented by two joint owners of a judgment debt who then fell out. Joint owners, the judge said, ordinarily act unanimously, as trustees do; one who wishes to proceed against the other’s dissent bears the onus of showing why he may. He found no authority directly in point.¹⁹Aabar Block SARL v Maud [2018] EWHC 1414 (Ch); [2019] Ch 15 (Snowden J, 11 June 2018), section headed ‘Joint petitioners’. The question of a single joint creditor issuing a demand or petition without the other was not before the court.

Anyone drafting the Malaysian amendment would do well to begin with section 418 of the New Zealand statute. It is short, and it is kind to debtors and creditors alike.

A WAY THROUGH

Three labels help here, and they should not be mixed. What the law is. What the words of the Act permit. What ought to be done.

The law now

There is no appellate answer. The High Court is divided. The Federal Court majority has assumed the Shah Alam view without deciding it. One member of the Court, in dissent, has stated it in terms.²⁰AmBank (n 7) [50]–[51] (Alizatul Khair FCJ, dissenting): because the judgment sum was one sum, the judgment creditors were ‘entitled under the law to issue a (single) bankruptcy notice’. She does not discuss section 5(1)(a), the Interpretation Acts, Michael Chong or Wah Hai Hing.

What the Act permits

Both readings are open. The Interpretation Acts favour the plural. Section 5(1)(a) favours the singular. Neither reading is absurd. The contrast with section 5(1)(a) is a real argument, and the Shah Alam judge did not answer it. Equally, a contrast between a notice and a petition does not by itself show that Parliament meant to bar joint holders of one judgment.

One setting deserves a separate word. Partners may take proceedings ‘in the name of the firm’, and the Rules say that ‘creditor’ includes ‘a firm of creditors in partnership’.²¹Insolvency Act 1967, s 103; Insolvency Rules 2017 (PU(A) 305/2017), r 2. Whether either reaches a bankruptcy notice, as distinct from a petition, I have found no decision. Form 34, the form of notice, speaks of a judgment ‘obtained by him against you’, in the singular; Form 41, the creditor’s petition, speaks of a sum owed to ‘me (or us)’. A firm of creditors, in other words, is already a unit. Its members are many; its demand is one. Whether joint holders of one judgment who are not partners may be treated alike is the open question.

What is submitted

A bankruptcy notice is the act of one creditor-unit on one judgment. The unit is the person, or the persons acting together, entitled to enforce that judgment as one. Separate debts are never added in one notice. A unit once formed is not dismembered after the notice issues.

The principle keeps every settled rule. It keeps the old rule that separate judgments cannot be combined, which the Rules now embody.²²Insolvency Rules 2017 (PU(A) 305/2017), r 89(2) (also reproduced in Re Hairulzam bin Mohamad, ex p Malayan Banking Bhd [2023] 10 MLJ 833 (HC)); Re Low, ex p Argentine Gold Fields [1891] 1 QB 147 (CA). Apart from the firm provisions noted at n 21, and r 106 (which relieves joint petitioners of the need for each to verify every statement in the petition), the Rules say nothing about joint creditors on the notice. It keeps the Federal Court’s refusal to let a unit fall apart. And it explains why joint creditors are different from creditors who merely happen to be many.

The debtor loses nothing by it. He receives one demand, for one debt. Payment to any of the joint creditors discharges all. The mischief the old cases feared, of several demands pressing at once, is simply absent.

WHO SHOULD FIX IT

Not the Rules Committee.

If s 3(1)(i) does not permit a joint notice, a rule that permitted one would be inconsistent with the Act and void to that extent. The Interpretation Acts say an Act prevails over subsidiary legislation.²³Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967, s 23(1); applied to s 3(1)(i) of Act 360 in Dr Shamsul Bahar v RHB Bank Bhd [2015] 4 MLJ 1; [2015] 4 CLJ 561 (FC) and AmBank (n 7) [34]. The rule ranks Act over rule. It does not rank one section of the Act over another.

So Parliament must act. Two short amendments would do it. Provide in terms that a notice may issue at the instance of a creditor or of creditors who together are entitled to enforce a single judgment. And provide, on the New Zealand model, that misjoinder or non-joinder does not invalidate a notice unless the debtor is prejudiced.

Until then, creditors should protect themselves. Name every joint creditor, or name one with the others’ written authority. Demand the whole sum, with interest quantified. Issue separate notices on separate judgments. Do not drop a creditor after the notice is out.

The Federal Court is likely to be asked again. Counsel who next meet the question would do well to put it squarely, with the Interpretation Acts and section 5(1)(a) set side by side, so that the answer arrives with its reasons.

Two creditors, one judgment. One question, and fifty years of waiting.

∞§∞

 

 

This is for general information only, not legal or technical advice. Obtain independent legal advice where needed.

Thanks to KN Geetha, TP Vaani, JN Lheela and Lydia Jaynthi of GK Legal, and Sebastian Dumitru of Unsplash for the image.

Claude assisted with drafting; Perplexity Pro fact-checked. The views and any errors are the author’s.

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